FALCON POWERS – In the wake of the resounding failure of the Israeli intelligence in October 7th, the discussion resurfaced again in the Israeli media about what is known in Israel as the “Concept” and the ways of formulating intelligence assessments by the “Aman” (military intelligence) division.
No sooner had the first hours of the “Al-Aqsa Torrent” operation passed than the Israeli occupation army realized the nature of the massive attack it was facing in the Gaza envelope. A massive multi-dimensional attack carried out by hundreds of fighters on the military positions and kibbutzim surrounding the Gaza Strip.
Throughout the period preceding the attack, the estimates of the Israeli military intelligence division (Aman) that reached the command of the Gaza division a few days before the “Al-Aqsa Torrent” operation concluded that the security situation with Gaza was quiet by nature, and that major events on the separation fence were not expected, and that there was no reliable intelligence information about any imminent attacks, and that the worst expected scenario was a simultaneous breach of two different points along the separation fence with the Gaza Strip, according to what the Hebrew newspaper “Maariv” reported.
In the wake of this resounding failure of the Israeli intelligence, the discussion resurfaced again in the Israeli media about the “Concept” and the ways of formulating intelligence assessments by the “Aman” division, and recalling the disastrous failure to warn about the October 1973 war, which was a “concept” for the military intelligence that it was impossible for the Egyptian and Syrian armies to launch an attack against Israel.
And after fifty years, this failure was repeated in the Israeli intelligence’s assessment of the security situation with the Gaza Strip, after the intelligence estimated that the “facilities” provided by the Israeli government to the residents of the Strip through Qatari mediation ensured a calm that the “deterred” Hamas leaders would maintain with money and economic improvement, which was a consideration of no value to the leadership of the Al-Qassam Brigades on October 7th, 2023.
“The Concept” Historically
“The Concept” is the pseudonym given by the “Agranat” Commission to the perception formulated by the Research Department of the Intelligence Division of the Israeli Occupation Army (AMAN) during 1971 regarding the condition of Egypt and Syria to wage war.
The “Agranat” Commission seems to have coined the nickname based on the testimony of the head of the Military Intelligence Unit in the war, General Eli Zeira, who often referred to the theory presented to him by researchers regarding the intentions of the Egyptian war as a “concept”, and at the core of this concept as defined by the Commission, there were three basic assumptions:
- Egypt will not wage war against Israel unless it first ensures its ability to attack the Israeli depth, especially the main Israeli airports, in order to paralyze the Israeli air force.
- Syria will not launch a major attack on Israel except at the same time that Egypt does.
- The Arabs will not be ready for war unless they can do something to confront the Israeli air force, and this will require the purchase of new aircraft (MiG-23 and MiG-25) and surface-to-surface missiles R-17 (Scud B) and Luna-M (Frog-7).
Before the war, Syria managed to obtain Frog-7 missiles, and Egypt obtained Scud B missiles, but the numbers received were still very small to pose a serious threat to Israeli air bases, and MiG-23 aircraft were only delivered after the start of the war and were not used in combat.
Accordingly, the condition in paragraph 3 of the concept was not fulfilled, and paragraph 1 became impossible, and any indications of the readiness of Egypt and Syria for war were interpreted by the Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) as “low probability of war”.
